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The 1983 Amendments to Rule 11: Answering the
Critics' Concern With Judicial Self-Restraint
The Supreme Court promulgated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.2
The original Rule 11 required attorney certification that the plead-
ings were well grounded and not interposed for delay, and elimi-
nated the prior pleading practice of using affidavits to verify
pleadings.3 Under the original Rule 11, courts had power to strike
unsigned or unfounded pleadings and to impose "appropriate dis-
ciplinary action" on an attorney for willful violations.4 Before im-
posing sanctions beyond striking the pleadings, however, courts
required a showing of bad faith on the part of the attorney.5 Be-
cause the original Rule 11 did not expressly define "appropriate
disciplinary action," courts were reluctant to impose opponent
costs and attorneys' fees without an additional showing of abuse of
process .6
Concern over the growing amount of frivolous litigation and
1 For the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as originally enacted, see note 8
infra [hereinafter referred to as Rule 11].
2 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064. Rule 11 remained
unchanged until amended in 1983.
3 See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1976). For an analysis of Rule 11 as
originally enacted, see Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11 -Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate
Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV. 751, 753-55 (1985).
4 Only twenty-three cases involving an attempt to strike a pleading under Rule 11 were
reported from 1938 to 1976. Risinger, supra note 3, at 25. A review of all reported federal
cases involving Rule 11 from 1970 to 1978 revealed that fewer than twenty cases were
reported in any one year. In 1979 to 1982, thirty to forty cases reported each year involved
Rule 11. Note, supra note 3, at 755 n.35. See also R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANC-
TIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Federal
Judicial Center) (1981) (finding only two cases where counsel had been disciplined under
original Rule 11).
5 The Seventh Circuit held that for an award of attorney's fees to qualify as an "appro-
priate disciplinary action" under the original Rule 11, a court must find subjective bad faith
or "willful" misconduct. Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.
1983). See also Hedison Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
See Note, Nemeroffv. Abelson, Bad Faith and Awards of Attorney's Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 468
(1979) (must show bad faith to receive attorney's fees under the original Rule 11). See
generally Rotschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think, and Investigate, 11 LITIGATION 13
(Winter 1985).
6 See R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note 4, at 64-65. For a general discus-
sion of exceptions to the American Rule that prevailing parties should bear their own attor-
ney's fees, see Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 205 (1985) (Appendix A).
NOTES
abuse of process through improper litigation tactics 7 spawned the
1983 amendments to Rule 11.8 The amendments allow the court,
as well as either party, to initiate a Rule 11 motion, whereas the
original Rule 11 only expressly allowed a party to initiate the mo-
tion.9 Also, the standard for judging possible Rule 11 violations
changed from that of subjective bad faith under the original Rule
11 to an objective standard of reasonable inquiry into the factual
and legal bases for every pleading, motion, and other paper filed.10
While limiting judicial discretion by making the imposition of sanc-
tions mandatory, the amended Rule 11 increases the variety of ex-
pressly articulated sanctions imposable for a Rule 11 violation."
Moreover, Rule 11 now expressly applies to pro se litigants in addi-
tion to litigants represented by counsel. 12 It also applies to "mo-
7 See generally P. RoTHsTEIN, THE NEW AMENDMENTS To THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1983); Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, JUDICATURE, Mar. 1983, at 363; Note, Deter-
ring Dilatory Tactics in Litigation: Proposed Amendments to Rules 7 and 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 895 (1982); Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted
the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l LJ., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 1.
8 The following text shows the additions and deletions effected by the 1983 amend-
ment (italics show additions, brackets deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party whQ is. not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity. that the averments of an answer under oath
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained
by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney orparty
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper,
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delayfformed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argyment for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is
signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham
and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.
For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is
inserted.] If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may includ.e an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2AJ. MOORE &J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDFRAL PRACTICE § 11.01[3] (2d ed. 1984). The 1983
amendments were effective August 1, 1983. 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
9 See notes 46-56 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
11 See note 69 infra.
12 See notes 78-94 infra and accompanying text.
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tions and other papers" as well as to initial pleadings.1 3
Several policy concerns are behind the amendments to Rule
11, which expanded the reach of the court and imposed compulsory
sanctions for frivolous or improper filings.1 4 The advisory commit-
tee felt that mandatory sanctions would encourage judicial control
of the docket by requiring public admonishment of attorneys and
parties whose filings abuse or misuse the litigation process.' 5 The
advisory committee believed that increased judicial willingness to
impose Rule 11 sanctions would deter future frivolous litigation.' 6
Compulsory sanctions would additionally compensate the victim by
reimbursing him for the expenses incurred in opposing the im-
proper pleading or motion.' 7
Although conservation ofjudicial resources, reduction of frivo-
lous litigation, and compensation of parties forced to defend
against a frivolous filing are seemingly incontrovertible goals, the
1983 amendments to Rule 11 met with substantial criticism.' 8
Commentators expressed concern that the extended reach of Rule
11 would excessively restrict access to the judicial system and in-
13 See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
14 Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc. 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Rule 11 "serves a
dual purpose: punishment and deterrence."); Taylor v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 226, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed mem., 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[D]ual
purposes served ... both to discourage frivolous litigation and to compensate the victims of
such abuse."). See also Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 201.
15 Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, and Member of the Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 192 (1983) ("mandating
sanctions... is viewed as a healthy deterrent.., and worth the risk of satellite litigation").
16 See Advisory Comm. Note on Fed R. Civ. P. 11 Submitted to the Standing Comm. on Rules of
Prac. and Proc. of the U.S. Judicial Conf., reported at 97 F.R.D. 198 (1983) (Amended Rule 11
will "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by
lessening frivolous claims or defenses.") [hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Note]; Mans-
field letter, supra note 15, 97 F.R.D. at 192 (Amendments to Rule 11 "would reduce frivo-
lous claims, defenses or motions by leading litigants to stop, think and investigate more
carefully before serving and filing papers.").
17 In In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985), the court upheld a bankruptcy court
ruling imposing costs and fees for filing two sets of frivolous amended pleadings that
merely repeated earlier frivolous claims. The court stated that "courts will ensure that each
party really does bear the costs and does not foist expenses off on its adversaries. One cost
of a lawsuit is research . . . .Suits are easy to file and hard to defend." Id. at 446.
18 See Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Some Questions About Power, I1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1011 (1983) (suggesting that the
mandatory nature of the sanctions exceeds the authority of the judicial rulemakers and
should be made by Congress); Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 701 (1983) (re-
quiring certification of all papers exacts a disproportionately great effort to prevent smaller
amounts of abuse); Patton, New Rules Intended to Streamline Pretrial Process, LEGAL TIMES, May
16, 1983, at 17, col. 2. But see Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in Federal
Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325 (arguing that the amendments to Rule I 1 did not go far
enough).
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crease the potential for judicial abuse.1 9 The most widespread con-
cern, however, centered on expanded Rule 1 l's potential for
retarding the development of innovative theories and applications
of law.2 0 The commentators were not reassured by the advisory
committee's assertion that they did not intend Rule 11 to have a
chilling effect on attorney creativity in arguing new theories of
law. 21
This note examines how the courts have applied Rule 11 since
its amendment in 1983. Part I outlines the major changes in Rule
11, examining the major criticisms of the amendments, how courts
have dealt with them, and how the courts' application of Rule 11
comports with the policy behind the amendments. Part II con-
dudes that the courts have answered the valid questions raised con-
cerning the 1983 amendments by exercising judicial caution in
utilizing the full power of expanded Rule 11.
I. The 1983 Amendments to Rule 11
A. Reasonable Inquiry Standard
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 changed the standard for
finding a violation from that of bad faith to one of failure to make
"reasonable inquiry" into the factual and legal bases of the filing.22
Some commentators have argued that this shift from a subjective
test to an objective inquiry would unfairly punish inartful pleadings
and innovative legal theories. 23
Most courts applying amended Rule 11, however, have im-
posed a requirement that the inquiry be reasonable given the cir-
cumstances in place at the time of filing.24 Courts have interpreted
19 Marcus, supra note 7, at 370 (Rule 11 "may tempt judges to take too much control
from the parties and their lawyers"). But see Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial
Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 625, 629 (1982) (suggesting that greater judi-
cial control is the key to curbing abusive litigation tactics).
20 See Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITIGATION 16, 55 (Winter 1985) ("One lawyer's
novel extension of the law is another's unwarranted abuse of the judicial system. . . . Pun-
ishing a lawyer for the legal theory he pleads ... will also stifle legitimate innovation.");
Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23
(1985) ("Lawyers are trained to be creative and to be aggressive for their clients. It is that
process that brings about meaningful changes in the law, changes which society requires in
order to move forward. Unfortunately, I believe Rule 11 may stifle this evolutionary
process.").
21 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 199 ("The rule is not intended to chill
an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.").
22 Id. at 198 ("The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances."). For a
discussion of the "reasonable inquiry" distinction, see Note, supra note 3, at 756-68. See also
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 759-61.
23 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
24 Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985) (appel-
late court reversed district court award of fees under Rule 11 and held that appellants had
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reasonable inquiry as requiring not perfect nor exhaustive legal re-
search, but merely a reasonable attempt to ascertain the present
state of the law. 25 In Pudlo v. Commissioner, the district court refused
to impose Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiff for filing an untimely
motion to quash an Internal Revenue Service lien. 26 Although a re-
cent decision by a higher court had rejected an argument similar to
the plaintiffs, the court declined to impose sanctions. 27 In Taylor v.
Belge Cartage Service, Inc.,28 however, the district court did impose
Rule 11 sanctions for failure to Shepardize a six-year-old case that
the plaintiff relied upon as his principal authority.
Although courts have applied Rule 11 sanctions to attorney
statements of current or controlling law, these cases have involved
questionable motives or intentional misstatements. 29 In Golden Ea-
reasonable grounds to believe in the complaint at the time that it was submitted due to
ambiguous nature of the court order granting leave to amend). In Sendi v. NCR COM-
TEN, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1986), the court declined to impose Rule 11 sanc-
tions on a party who filed a second claim ten days before a virtually identical lawsuit
involving the same parties was dismissed. The court held that the decision to file was "mis-
guided" but understandable given the pressure of a running statute of limitations. Id. at
1207. See also El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1038, 1040
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (court refused to impose sanctions as not clear that the claim was patently
baseless at the time it was filed).
25 See, e.g., Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) (Although
the "pleader need not be correct in his view of the law ... the conclusion drawn from the
research undertaken must itself be defensible. Extended research alone will not save a claim
that is without legal or factual merit."); Wagner v. Allied Chemical Corp., 623 F. Supp.
1407 (D. Md. 1985) (holding sufficient inquiry into factual basis to support filing of a per-
sonal injury claim to talk with one doctor who examined the claimants); Ring v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1281-82 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (imposing sanctions where
minimal inquiry would have shown that action for wrongful discharge unwarranted under
established precedent); Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587 F. Supp. 536, 538 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (finding that counsel failed to make minimal inquiry into the bases for claim of
right to jury trial in a sex discrimination case).
26 587 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
27 Id. at 1012.
28 102 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
29 See, e.g., Confederation Laborista de Puerto Rico v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 778 F.2d
65, 66 (Ist Cir. 1985) (finding union claim that it was not obligated to exhaust grievance
procedures under collective bargaining agreement sanctionable under Rule 11 given "the
clarity of the precedents of both the Supreme Court and this court on this issue"); Rodgers
v. Lincoln Towing Service, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions on
counsel for arguing the incorrect law as controlling); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (appellee "could not have reasonably read Colonial Times" to
justify its position, therefore the appellee had no reasonable basis in existing law to support
its position); In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 637, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("no citation of apt
authority or even minimally acceptable supporting argument, and in total disregard of the
Supreme Court authority"); Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 625 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla.
1986) (counsel for owners of Porky's, a topless bar, sought temporary restraining order to
prevent enforcement of adult entertainment ordinance but failed to cite controlling author-
ity); H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(cases cited as supporting were "patently inapposite"); Johnson v. Veterans' Admin., 107
F.R.D. 626, 628 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (court found "that a competent attorney, after reason-
able inquiry, would have determined that judicial review of the Veterans' Administration's
[Vol. 61:798
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gle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs, the District Court for the Northern
District of California imposed Rule 11 sanctions upon determining
that counsel had argued cases as controlling law when, in fact,
counsel was really arguing for the extension of existing law.3 0 In
Golden Eagle, the court found that the defendant's argument that a
court need not apply the law of the original forum if the original
forum would have dismissed for forum non conveniens was not
supported by precedent. The court noted that Rule 11 sanctions
were especially appropriate in this case because counsel had ne-
glected to cite any conflicting precedent.3 1
Courts have cautiously applied Rule 11 to attempts by attor-
neys to extend current law or to suggest a novel application of ex-
isting precedent.3 2 Courts have refused to impose Rule 11
sanctions when the attorney conduct involved a misunderstand-
ing 33 of the law or a supportable attempt to argue for a different
decision denying veteran benefits was precluded by the relevant statutory and case law");
Booker v. City of Atlanta, 586 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (city filed motion to dismiss
using argument that had been explicitly rejected by longstanding authority). See also
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 193 ("A court has the right to expect that counsel will state the
controlling law fairly and fully.").
The canons of legal ethics support this position. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBiLITY DR 7-102(A) (1981). In relevant part, DR 7-102(A) provides that:
[A] lawyer shall not:
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law [unless] it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
30 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
31 Id. at 127.
32 See, e.g., Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). In
Eastway, the court dismissed the contractor's complaint alleging antitrust and civil rights
violations and awarded municipal defendants attorney's fees but stated that:
[W]e do not intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very
lifeblood of the law. . . .Courts must strive to avoid the wisdom of hindsight...
and any and all doubt must be resolved in favor of the signer. But where it is
patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing
precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, mod-
ify, or reverse the law as it stands, Rule 11 has been violated.
Id. at 254. Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1985). In Zick, the
court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff in an improper discharge action. The court
found that the plaintiff was arguing for an extension of state law which was beyond the
power of the federal courts. Id. at 930. The court also chastised the plaintiff for not even
attempting to distinquish the controlling cases. Id. at 932.
33 See, e.g., Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985)
(no sanction appropriate as reasonable misunderstanding of ambiguous court order grant-
ing leave to amend); Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., 105 F.R.D. 567, 568 (D.D.C. 1985)
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interpretation of existing law.34 When faced with a situation where
strict application of the reasonable inquiry standard might stifle
legal creativity or punish unintentional inartful filings, courts seem
to return to pre-amendment standards and retain the requirement
of improper motivation before finding a violation. For example, in
Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. ,3 the Fourth Circuit refused to re-
verse a lower court's denial of attorney's fees even though the
plaintiffs attorney could cite no supporting authority for his expan-
sive statements of statutory interpretation. The court held that the
attorney's reliance "upon anti-discrimination provisions in hiring
that were not dissimilar in purpose and scope" to the statute that
he was trying to extend did not violate Rule 1 1.36
The courts have, however, been more willing to find a violation
of the reasonable inquiry standard when the filings have exhibited
some characteristics of abuse of process. Patent violations ofjuris-
dictional rules inspire harsher Rule 11 sanctions than do most
other types of questionable motivation. 37 Courts appear equally
(given blur between concepts of conversion and debt, plaintiff's confusion not subject to
Rule 11 sanction); Pudlo v. Commissioner, 587 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (filing of
untimely motion to quash not subject to Rule 11 sanctions as misreading of Internal Reve-
nue Code not unreasonable); Taylor v. Belge Cartage Service, 102 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (Rule 11 does not prohibit assertion of claims where the facts and law are less than
clear).
34 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversed district
court award of Rule 11 sanctions holding that suggestion of political motivation for suit not
an appropriate reason to impose sanctions when claim a well-grounded argument for ex-
tension of existing law); Chicago Bd. Options Exch. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 713 F.2d
254 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversed district court ruling that argument for novel interpretation of
ERISA violated Rule 11); EEOC v. County of Hennepin, 623 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Minn
1985) (no sanctions imposed on county application for protective order against EEOC sub-
peona but court warned that, as issue now settled, similar action in the future would receive
sanctions); Boorstein v. City of New York, 107 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denied Rule 11
motion holding that the motion to strike a Rule 68 offer of settlement was procedurally
permissible and, in the alternative, represented a good faith argument for extending the
current law); Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Hess, 594 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (novel arguments for extension of ERISA not subject to Rule 11 sanction).
35 750 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1984).
36 Id. at 1238.
37 See, e.g., Kearney v. Smith, 624 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff filed com-
plaint based on diversity jurisdiction including four defendants with the same state citizen-
ship as the plaintiff); Hearld v. Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17, 19
(E.D. Tex. 1985) ("improper purpose was the creation of the appearance of diversity juris-
diction"); Ilardi v. Bechtel Power Corp., 106 F.R.D. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (manipulation of
facts for creation of diversity jurisdiction warrants Rule 11 sanctions); Weir v. Lehman
Newspapers, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574, 575 (D. Colo. 1985) (no basis for subject matterjurisdic-
tion for invasion of plaintiffs "right to freedom of association and right to personal choice
in marital life"); Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984) (failure to reasonably
inquire into factual basis for diversity jurisdiction); Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577
(E.D. Mo. 1984) (any factual inquiry by the plaintiff would have shown that in personam
jurisdiction clearly was not established); WSB Elec. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-
Gate Sys., 103 F.R.D. 417, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("attempt to squeeze plaintiff's claim into
[Vol. 61:798
unforgiving when the situation involves a questionable characteri-
zation of the facts combined with an improper purpose. In Davis v.
Veslan Enterprises,38 the Fifth Circuit upheld sanctions imposed for
defendant's filing of a petition for removal of state court proceed-
ings one day before a scheduled hearing on plaintiffs motion for
judgment on the verdict. The appellate court rejected the defend-
ant's questionable characterization of the plaintiffs closing state-
ment to support an abandonment of claims argument which
established diversity jurisdiction.3 9 Instead, the court imposed sanc-
tions for violating Rule 11 by focusing on the fact that the defend-
ant designed its motion to delay judgment, thereby saving a
substantial amount of money.40
In addition to improper jurisdictional claims, courts have re-
acted strongly to the filing of nuisance lawsuits which simply rehash
an already litigated dispute.41 Tax protest cases also inspire a large
concentration of Rule 11 discussion. 42 Courts have additionally im-
posed sanctions in response to the broadshot approach of naming
defendants who are only tangentially connected to the actual litiga-
tion.43 Moreover, courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions when the
pleadings were filed to obtain discovery, hopefully enabling the
plaintiff to uncover some factual basis for an unsubstantiated
claim.44 Finally, courts have threatened sanctions when they per-
mold of existing law by a wholly reckless and disingenuous presentation of the case" to
establish federal jurisdiction).
38 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
39 Id. at 500.
40 Id.
41 Filippini v. Austin, 106 F.R.D. 425, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("the number of times this
case has been considered by this court and parts of this case by other judges ... suggests
that this action is precisely the kind that the amendments to Rule 11 were designed to
prevent").
42 See, e.g., United States v. Koblinski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984) (wages
are income); Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984); Granzow v. Commis-
sioner, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983);
McCoy v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983); Miller v. United States, 604 F.
Supp. 804 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Johnson v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Snyder v. Commissioner, 596 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Aune v. United States, 582 F.
Supp. 1132 (D. Ariz. 1984). But cf. Blair v. United States Treasury Dept., 596 F. Supp. 273
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (a valid tax dispute, although lost, will not result in Rule 11 sanctions);
Davis v. United States, 104 F.R.D. 509, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("plaintiffs tax return was frivo-
lous, this lawsuit was not").
43 Foster v. Michelin Tire Corp., 108 F.R.D. 412 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (plaintiff sued three
tire companies in a wrongful death action without ascertaining which company had manu-
factured the allegedly defective tires); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 512, 513
(E.D. La. 1985) (employer filed third-party complaint alleging that Texaco had failed to
warn him that "grease is slippery").
44 In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 498 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (purpose of going "fishing for
an undefined catch" not a defense to Rule 11 motion for sanctions); City of Yonkers v. Otis
Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (pleadings must have factual predicate at
the time the claims are asserted and need for further discovery is no defense to a Rule 11
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ceive the plaintiff has filed suit to obtain a settlement rather than to
redress a legitimate wrong.45
Although granted the use of an objective standard, the courts
have not exercised this power to the full extent. Courts have instead
been extremely conservative in extending the reach of Rule 11
sanctions. This judicial reluctance to apply the full reach of
amended Rule 11 indicates that courts recognize the potential for
abuse inherent in the Rule as amended, and will continue to refrain
from excessive judicial activism in controlling the docket.
B. Sue Sponte Power to Initiate Rule 11 Sanctions
Rule 11 expressly allows either party, as well as the court, to
initiate a motion to impose Rule 11 sanctions, whereas the original
Rule 11 only allowed parties to seek sanctions for Rule 11 viola-
tions.46 The drafters of Rule 11 designed this explicit granting of
sua sponte power to encourage active court involvement in control-
ling the docket, and to overcome traditional judicial reluctance to
impose sanctions absent a motion from a party.47 Several commen-
tators have argued that increased judicial willingness to impose
Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte would result in increased animosity
and decreased cooperation between judges and attorneys. 48
Although granted the express power to initiate Rule 11 mo-
tions, courts are reluctant to exercise the full extent of their power.
Many courts have held out Rule 11 sanctions as a warning before
actually imposing them.49 In Friedlander v. Nims,50 the District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia cited Rule 11 in a cautionary
motion for sanctions); Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (allegations of worldwide conspiracy based on one pair of counterfeit jeans were
baseless and designed to elicit supporting facts upon discovery).
45 Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984) (no Rule 11 sanctions granted
although considered appropriate for strike suits in the future).
46 See note 8 supra.
47 Rule 11 amendments were "intended to recognize judicial management as part of
the judicial job description." Miller, Proceedings of the Second Judicial Conference, 101 F.R.D.
161, 199 (1983). Rule 11 is "intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanc-
tions." Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 348.
48 Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court declines to
impose sanctions for improper venue finding that overzealous use of Rule 11 would "de-
stroy the atmosphere of friendly cooperation and professional collegiality" between attor-
neys, thus jeopardizing future settlement offers); Weiss, supra note 20, at 24 (Rule 11
unneccessarily injects "an additional adversarial proceeding that will only exacerbate [the]
hostility and reduce the possibilities for settlement" into the judicial process.).
49 Donaldson v. Clark, 105 F.R.D. 526, 537 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (imposing sanctions after
repeated warnings "that Rule 11 sanctions would be considered if he failed to establish any
factual basis for the complaint"); Etshokin v. Texasglf, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 320 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (court permitted plaintiff to amend complaint following two years of discovery but
warned that Rule 11 sanctions would be likely if the complaint could not survive a motion
for summary judgment); Ross v. Ross, 104 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (dismissing a poodle
bite complaint with leave to amend but warning of possible Rule 11 considerations if the
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manner when dismissing a complaint with leave to amend under
Rule 9(b) for failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. In
Friedlander, the court gave the plaintiffs fifteen days to amend their
pleadings. The court, however, cautioned that it would expect "the
strictest compliance with Rule 11" in any subsequently filed plead-
ings.51 The Second Circuit also cited Rule 11 as a warning when
reports of pre-trial conversations indicated that the plaintiff initi-
ated lawsuits to encourage business associates to renew contracts.52
Most courts have narrowly construed the language of Rule 11
to restrict the breadth of its application.53 In Elliot v. Perez,54 how-
ever, the plaintiff filed a civil rights claim against a government offi-
cial which raised the issue of governmental tort immunity. The
court interpreted Rule 11 to require the plaintiff to plead govern-
mental misconduct with particularity. The court further required
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant could not maintain a
successful defense of tort immunity.55 Although the court's exten-
sive discussion of the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 11
appears expansive, considerations of tort immunity are logical in a
suit against a government official. The court may also be attempt-
ing to heighten the pleading requirement to deter unfounded suits
aimed at a perceived governmental deep pocket. In Elliot, the
court's discussion of Rule 11 was a warning for future filings, as the
court vacated the original dismissal and did not impose Rule 11
sanctions.56
amended pleading was not sufficiently clear as to what type of poodle, who owned the dog,
and who was bit).
50 571 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ga. 1983). In Friedlander, the plaintiff alleged various fraud-
ulent schemes including violations of securities laws and RICO but failed to allege any
specific wrongdoing on the part of one of the defendants, Timex.
51 Id. at 1194-95.
52 In Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Esprit De Corp, Inc., 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.
1985), the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants. After learning that the plaintiff sued any big account who declined to renew its
contract with the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was currently involved in fifteen lawsuits, the
court warned that as "these remarks and testimony suggest that Burlington has an ongoing
policy of bringing litigation without regard to the merits solely to affect business decisions
of those with whom it deals," Rule I 1 sanctions were possible in future litigation. Id. at 927
n.2. Several months later, a lower court did impose sanctions on Burlington for maintain-
ing a suit in the face of overwhelmingly contrary facts. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse
v. Belk Bros. Co., 621 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
53 Wenneshiemer v. Foreway Express, Inc. 624 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D. Wis. 1986)
(action seeking damages for loss of seniority under collective bargaining agreement not
sanctionable because originally filed in state court where legal position was tenable under
state law).
54 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985) (to plead cases raising the probable defense of gov-
ernmental tort immunity, counsel, under Rule 11 standards, is affirming a belief that the
defense may fail).
55 Id. at 1481.
56 Id.
19861
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Improper use of Rule 11 sanctions by both the court and liti-
gants can defeat the purpose of the Rule. A party's use of a Rule 1I
motion as an offensive litigation tactic may be met by judicial impo-
sition of sanctions. For example, courts have threatened sanctions
for using a Rule 11 motion as a substitute for discovery, to delay the
proceedings, to harass the opponent, or to generally misuse the
Rule.57 If the court, however, imposes Rule 11 sanctions exces-
sively, then the court causes the delay in the proceedings. The
drafters of the amendments to Rule 11 were cognizant of the per-
verse possibility of parties attempting to use a rule primarily
designed to control improper litigation tactics for a purpose other
than that for which it was promulgated. Arthur Miller, Reporter of
the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules, recounted his "re-
current Kafkaesque dream... [of a motion] to sanction the sanc-
tion motion." 58
One reason for judicial self control is the concern that Rule 11
sanctions may hamper efficiency by creating satellite litigation.
Courts, in attempting to deter frivolous filings, do not want to
cause oppressive satellite litigation.59 In Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc. ,60
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
overruled a lower court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions. The court
remanded for a determination of appropriate sanctions, urging the
court on remand "to be mindful that the costs of sanction litigation
can exceed the efficiencies sought by the Federal Rules, and thus to
limit the scope of its proceedings accordingly." 61
In another example of judicial awareness of the potential ad-
verse effect of excessive use of Rule 11 sanctions, the district court
in Martinez, Inc. v. Landau & Co. held that Rule 11 did not apply to
particular arguments within the filings, but rather applied to the
motion taken as a whole.62 Otherwise, the court held, sanctioning
57 See, e.g., Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Hess, 594 F. Supp. 273 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (defendant's request for Rule 11 sanctions in response to plaintiffs novel argu-
ment for extension of the law was frivolous); Van Dorn Co. v. Howington, 623 F. Supp.
1548, 1559 (N.D. Ohio 1985) ("motion for sanctions under Rule 11 should not be lightly
made by a party or granted by a court"); Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., 585 F.
Supp. 69, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (the court cautioned against using a Rule 11 motion as substi-
tute for discovery). Judge Schwarzer points out that the potential for the perverse result of
actually aiding the party attempting to delay the proceedings or harass the opponent exists
if the proceeding to determine the Rule 11 sanction is lengthy. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at
184.
58 Miller, supra note 47, at 200.
59 "To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the
pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of
sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to
the record." Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 201.
60 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
61 Id. at 1179.
62 107 F.R.D. 775 (N.D. Ind. 1985). In Martinez, the original defendant, Landau, filed a
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individual arguments within the filing "would spawn litigation as
potentially abusive as that which Rule 11 is designed to prevent." 63
The court further cautioned against allowing Rule 11 motions to
take on "a life of their own through their use for every motion filed
in a case.'64 Thus, although courts can succumb to the temptation
of imposing Rule 11 sanctions for purposes outside those envi-
sioned by the drafters of the 1983 amendments, 65 the majority of
courts have been extremely careful in applying Rule 11.
C. Mandatory Sanctions for Rule 11 Violations
The original Rule 11 allowed a court to impose sanctions for
violations, whereas Rule 11, as amended, requires a court to impose
sanctions. 66 The courts, however, still retain substantial discretion
in determining when the standard of reasonable inquiry has been
violated.67 Once the court determines that a Rule 11 violation has
occurred, the court must then impose sanctions. 68 Although Rule
11 explicitly authorizes the imposition of reasonable costs and at-
torney's fees on the transgressing party, it also grants the court dis-
cretion to tailor its choice of an appropriate sanction to the
particular facts of the case. 69
counterclaim alleging RICO violations by the plaintiff, Martinez. In response, Martinez
filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on four grounds. Two of the grounds were
arguably frivolous while the remaining two arguments were subsequently rejected by a con-
trary Supreme Court decision.
63 Id. at 779.
64 Id. at 777.
65 Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (Rule 11 sanctions imposed for failure to accept a generous settlement
offer); Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court deferred
decision on amount of Rule 11 sanctions for filing of improper motion to encourage
settlement).
66 See note 8 supra.
67 See Note, supra note 3, at 760.
68 See, e.g., Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985);
McLaughlin v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 105 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Ala. 1985);
Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 607 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Hearld v. Barnes & Spec-
trum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
69 "The court, however, retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with vio-
lations of the rule." Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 200. Various courts have
responded to Rule 11 violations with sanctions other than costs and attorney's fees. See,
e.g., Bockman v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (ordering copies of
opinion given to every member of the sanctioned attorney's law firm); Stewart v. City of
Chicago, 622 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (striking pleading for failure to sign but holding
that court cannot impose Rule 11 sanction as no signature at all does not violate certifica-
tion standard); Hearld v. Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Tex.
1985) (imposing $5,000 fine payable to the court); Valient-Bey v. Morris, 620 F. Supp. 903
(E.D. Mo. 1985) (striking claim signed by unlicensed jailhouse "counselor" on behalf of
fellow inmate); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (asking counsel to
show cause why he should not be suspended from practice in front of the court for viola-
tions of Rule 11); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (court consid-
ers referring name of counsel to state bar association for disciplinary action but also
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The court may also, at its discretion, direct appropriate sanc-
tions toward the party, the attorney, or both.70 Courts have used
this power to directly sanction attorneys when the objectionable as-
pect of the filing involves a misstatement or misapplication of the
law. 7' Courts also direct the sanction toward the attorney when
there are indications of improper attorney motivation for the filing.
In Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Machinery,72 the court imposed
Rule 11 sanctions directly on the attorney for continuing a personal
injury suit even after discovery revealed that the statute of limita-
tions barred the suit. The court found that the plaintiffs attorney
did not intend to benefit his client in any fashion, and therefore, the
attorney should bear the full brunt of the sanctions. In Lepucki v.
Van Wormer,73 the Seventh Circuit upheld an Indiana district court's
imposition of sanctions against both a tax protest attorney and his
client. The court called the attorney's actions "examples of irre-
sponsible advocacy falling below minimum professional standards
and deserving of penalty." 74 Absent an obvious indication of bad
faith or misuse of process, the courts impose joint and several lia-
bility for violations of Rule 11.75
In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Hand,76 however, the Tenth Circuit up-
held the imposition of sanctions on the client where the party
agreed to a settlement and subsequently filed a motion to set aside
the agreement. The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's finding
that actions were undertaken to delay the judgment for business
reasons and that, as the obvious instigator of the improper filing,
the party should bear the full brunt of the sanctions. Absent a clear
indication of individual culpability or initiative, however, the courts
are reluctant to single out who should pay the sanctions.
This reluctance to point an accusatory finger absent a clear in-
holding that Rule 11 does not authorize punitive damages). See also Schwarzer, supra note 6,
104 F.R.D. at 201-05.
70 The court has "the discretion to impose sanctions on either the attorney, the party
the signing attorney represents, or both." Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at
200.
71 See, e.g., Bockman v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (attorney
filed baseless claim to decertify class); Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574
(D. Colo. 1985) (imposed on counsel due to his inappropriate use of the law); Wrenn v.
New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 104 F.R.D. 553, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (attorney failed
to sign pleading even after omission brought to her attention and exhibited "a cavalier,
bordering on contemptuous, disregard for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rules of this Court").
72 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
73 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985).
74 Id. at 87.
75 See, e.g., City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); WSB
v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop 2-Gate Sys., 103 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (complaint
lacked base in both law and fact).
76 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
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dication of responsibility reflects the courts' primary goal of deter-
ring future frivolous filings. 77 Holding. the attorney and client
jointly and severally liable for Rule 11 violations also assures that
the party injured by the frivolous filing is reimbursed for his costs.
D. Application to Pro Se Litigants
Rule 11 certification requirements now apply to pro se litigants
as well as to litigants represented by counsel, whereas the original
Rule 1 1 only applied to the latter.78 Some commentators have ar-
gued that extending Rule 11 to pro se litigants, combined with the
less subjective standard of reasonable inquiry, would result in an
excessive restraint on access to the judicial system for these liti-
gants. 79 The Advisory Committee, while emphasizing Rule l1's ap-
plicability to pro se litigants, stressed that "the court has sufficient
discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often
arise in pro se situations."' 0 In applying Rule 11, the courts have
maintained their conservative stance and have held pro se litigants
to a lesser standard of inquiry than attorneys.8 1 For example, the
District Court for the District of Minnesota, while citing the more
stringent standard of reasonable inquiry, expressed a reluctance to
impose sanctions on pro se litigants whose claims were "sincere"
but unfounded. 82 Other courts have exhibited a similar reluctance
to impose sanctions absent an obvious indication of bad faith or
abuse of process.8 3
The sliding scale of inquiry available in Rule 11 has prevented
it from being used to deny pro se litigants access to the court sys-
tem.84 Courts have not imposed Rule 11 sanctions on pro se liti-
77 Focusing on determining the more culpable party would both decrease the efficiency
of the sanctioning process and lessen the less guilty party's incentive to closely watch the
actions of the other.
78 See note 8 supra.
79 "[O]ur society is a great society, in part, because we have access to the courts as we
do." Weiss, supra note 20, at 24.
80 Advisoy Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 199.
81 Davis v. United States, 104 F.R.D. 509, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (pro se litigant cannot
"reasonably be expected to know the existence" of timeliness requirements).
82 Bigalk v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Rochester, 107 F.R.D. 210 (D. Minn. 1985). In
Bigalk, farmers appearing pro se challenged a 1977 loan under the Truth in Lending Act.
The court found their claims baseless but declined to impose sanctions. The court warned,
however, that "parties bringing similar baseless actions in the future" include those appear-
ing pro se. Id. at 213.
83 Cavallary v. Lakewood Sky Diving Center, 623 F. Supp. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on a pro se litigant who had signed a valid waiver with the
defendant. The court stressed that this action was "the second action Cavallary has filed
against Lakewood despite the fact thatJudge Doherty ruled he is contractually bound not to
sue them." Id. at 245. The court expressed reluctance to impose sanctions against a pro se
litigant but found his complaint frivolous and "spiteful." Id. at 246.
84 A sliding scale has also been suggested for judging attorney violations of Rule 11.
Filippini v. Austin, 106 F.R.D. 425, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (suggesting that three considera-
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gants absent some propensity for being excessively litigious8 5 or for
filing improperly motivated motions. 86 The cases where pro se liti-
gants have received Rule 11 sanctions have involved, with few ex-
ceptions, abuse of the litigation process by filing numerous suits87
or naming tenuously connected parties as defendants.8 8 The non-
litigious pro se litigants who have received Rule 11 sanctions were
found to have abused the process through the filing of improperly
motivated actions. 89 Although the courts do not appear willing to
hold pro se litigants to the same standard of reasonable inquiry into
the law as attorneys, the courts are willing to address problems of
abuse of the system by imposing Rule 11 sanctions on pro se
litigants.
tions impact on reasonableness of the attorney's inquiry: time available for inquiry, source
of the facts relied upon, and plausibility of attorney's view of the law). See also Schwarzer,
supra note 6, at 201 (suggests sliding scale according to level of lawyer's expertise and firm
resources); Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 199.
85 Taylor v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dis-
missed mem., 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984). The court found that the plaintiffs "beleaguering
saga" of seven lawsuits represented the "paragon of harassing and vexatious litigation to
which the sanctions of Rule 11 are directed." Id. at 227. The court still expressed reluc-
tance to impose sanctions but found that the plaintiff's behavior had "wrought untold in-
jury upon its victims... [and drew] away from [the court's] already overburdened docket."
Id.
86 Dominquez v. Figel, 626 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Ind. 1986). The court imposed sanctions
on a pro se litigant who filed a claim alleging violations of his constitutional rights to take a
shower and exercise religious freedom during a prison lockdown. The court found that the
inmate had actually been allowed to take showers during the lockdown and had been of-
fered a personal in-cell visit by the prison chaplain. The court described the resultant
"waste ofjudicial resources" as "inexcusable" and imposed sanctions. Id. at 374.
87 Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A]fter losing in state
court [defendant] brought eight separate federal court actions which were meritless."
Court remanded with suggestion that lower court reconsider denial of Rule 11 sanctions).
88 Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985) (court found that
refiling of already dismissed suit with addition of numerous government defendants vio-
lated Rule 11).
89 In Sloan v. United States, 621 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ind. 1985), the court imposed
Rule 11 sanctions on the pro se husband and wife litigants. The Sloans claimed that they
were not taxpayers and, therefore, not subject to an IRS investigatory summons. The court
rejected their arguments unequivocally, finding that their wages were indeed income and
further stating that "suits such as this waste precious judicial resources, and incur needless
costs for the respondent. Such irresponsible use of the courts to harass the government
and delay the orderly administration of the Internal Revenue laws will not be tolerated."
Id. at 1075. Despite the court's visible ire with the litigation, the court expressed reluctance
to impose sanctions on members of a "network of misguided citizens who believe they can
exempt themselves from the Internal Revenue laws despite the clear judicial precedent to
the contrary." Id. at 1076. See, e.g., Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir.
1985) (self-drafted land patents claiming title superior to that of lien holder had no purpose
for filing claim other than delay, harassment, or obstinancy); Smith v. Egger, 108 F.R.D. 44,
45 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (complaint asking for injunction against IRS tax levy was "filed solely
for the purpose of harassment and/or to cause delay in the ultimate payment of taxes");
Pawloske v. Chrysler Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (pro se litigant sued employer
for money removed from paycheck pursuant to a tax levy ignoring binding precedent that
can only proceed against IRS).
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The court's reluctance to impose the reasonable inquiry re-
quirement on pro se litigants is consistent with the policy rationale
supporting Rule 1l's expanded application. 90 Promoting judicial
economy through minimizing frivolous suits can only be achieved if
Rule 11 sanctions result in a decreased number of future filings.
Because it is doubtful that future pro se litigants will have knowl-
edge of presently imposed sanctions, imposing punishment on pro
se litigants does not serve the deterrence purpose of Rule 11.
Therefore, the courts should impose sanctions on pro se litigants
only when the litigant's behavior is so egregious or the purpose so
improper as to justify reimbursing the defendant for the harm
caused.9 1 Moreover, courts have access to alternative methods be-
yond Rule 11 to punish litigious individuals 92 or to control the pro-
mulgation of meritless pro se suits through its inherent93 or
statutory powers. 94
E. Rule 11 Applied to Motions and Other Papers
Amended Rule 11 applies to pleadings, motions, and other pa-
pers, whereas the original Rule 11 only applied to pleadings.
Although courts have cautiously applied amended Rule lI's objec-
tive standard and its expanded application to pro se litigants, courts
have not been as cautious in applying the extended reach of Rule
11 beyond pleadings to motions and other papers. This expansive
application of amended Rule 11 by the courts to motions and other
90 See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
91 Sanctions, however, do serve to deter litigious individual pro se litigants as well as to
reimburse those defendants subjected to particularly egregious abuse of process. In Taylor
v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed mem., 751
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984), the court awarded defendants $35,000 in legal fees.
92 The court can use several other provisions within the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to control litigants who abuse the judicial process: Rule I (all claims to proceed expe-
ditiously); Rule 12() (strike an insufficient defense); Rule 41(d) (impose costs on plaintiff
who refiles a previously dismissed lawsuit); and Rule 56(g) (summary judgment if filed
solely for delay). Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the awarding
of costs and damages for frivolous appeals. See Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and
Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 WILLAME=TE L.J. 441 (1984)
(outlining variety of methods courts may use to control the proliferation of suits by prison
inmates).
93 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980) (court must make spe-
cific finding of bad faith to exercise inherent power to sanction parties); Badillo v. Central
Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (must have element of bad faith to exercise court's
inherent power to award attorney's fees under the original Rule 11).
94 The court can impose fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1297 (1982) on parties who vexatiously
multiply proceedings in federal court. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030 (9th
Cir. 1985) (finding that injunction against further filing of further causes of action without
leave of the court is appropriate under the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982)). The
court can impose damages for frivolous appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982). A court
may also dismiss civil and criminal cases brought in forma pauperis if frivolous under 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).
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filings, however, is consistent with the policy concerns supporting
the Rule 11 amendments.
Some commentators expressed concern that the application of
Rule 11 to post-pleading filings would punish a party for ignorance
of law passed or discovered subsequent to the filing of the initial
pleading. 95 Courts have not applied Rule 11, however, to punish a
party's failure to discover applicable law, as long as the party made
a reasonable inquiry into the status of the law at the time of the
filing.96 Furthermore, courts have not imposed Rule 11 sanctions
in cases where the law or facts were discovered subsequent to the
filing, unless the attorney had notice of the new development and
was given adequate opportunity to withdraw voluntarily or amend
his pleading.97 On the other hand, courts have imposed relatively
harsh Rule 11 sanctions on parties who have maintained a com-
plaint or defended a motion in the face of incontrovertible evidence
or law contrary to their position.98
Courts appear more willing to apply an expansive interpreta-
tion of Rule 1 1 to control the intra-litigation proliferation of mo-
tions. Courts have threatened Rule 11 sanctions when discussing
motions, especially where counsel has automatically opposed a
valid motion or has filed a counter-motion not based in good law.99
Courts have not required any indication of bad faith or improper
purpose to impose Rule 11 sanctions on a party filing an improper
motion. When, however, the courts have found evidence of an im-
95 See Snyder, supra note 20, at 55.
96 Hansen v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no sanction in libel
action even though plaintiff did not dismiss after contrary decision as court felt that plaintiff
might have been able to distinquish his case); Lunbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1542
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (claim filed prior to handing down of controlling decision not subject to
Rule 11 sanction).
97 Pudlo v. Commissioner, 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The court
suggested that if plaintiffs had not voluntarily dismissed after being informed of the un-
timely nature of the petition, Rule 11 sanctions would have been appropriate. The control-
ling decision had only been issued in advance sheet form when the claim was filed.
98 Skrobacz v. International Harvester, 582 F. Supp. 1192, 1195-96 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(sanctions imposable when plaintiff refused to dismiss suit after being given cite to recently
decided Supreme Court case directly contrary to plaintiff's position); Woodfork ex rel.
Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (plaintiff opposed motion to dismiss
despite dirth of supporting facts or law); City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F.R.D.
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff refused to dismiss fraud claim when presented with the op-
portunity to do so).
99 Sony Corp. v. S.W.I. Trading, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 541, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (imposing
Rule 11 sanctions for filing a motion to vacate a default emphasizing that "the requirement
in Rule 11 that no motion is to be filed without careful consideration as to its basis in law
and fact"); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 512, 514 (E.D. La. 1985) (defendant
filing frivolous third-party complaint resisted motion for summary judgment even though
obviously baseless); Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defend-
ants moved for summary judgment in the midst of the court's admonition discouraging the
filing of such a motion).
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proper motive, they have responded by imposing harsh sanctions.
For example, in Davis v. Veslan Enterprises,'00 the Fifth Circuit
awarded both reasonable fees and interest totaling $38,843.99 for a
filing which improperly sought to postpone payment on a state
courtjudgment. This case suggests that the severity of the sanction
imposed will depend on the level of improper motivation apparent
in the filing.
The courts appear willing to impose a stricter reasonable in-
quiry standard on motions and other papers filed with the court
after initial pleadings. After finding a Rule 11 violation in a subse-
quent filing, courts have also been willing to impose greater sanc-
tions. 1° 1 The increased aggressiveness of the court's application of
Rule 11 to post-pleading filings stems, in part, from the docket con-
trol concern underlying the amendments.
Enthusiastic judicial application of Rule 11 sanctions to intra-
litigation motions, however, may impact negatively on the goal of
docket control and judicial efficiency. A number of courts have
held that imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on a motion satisfies the
requirements for a collateral appeal. 102 Therefore, the potential for
satellite litigation is significant in cases where courts impose Rule
11 sanctions at the time of deciding the improper motion. The pos-
sibility of satellite litigation, however, is outweighed by the benefits
of considering the Rule 11 sanction when discussing the motion
rather than at the end of the litigation. Having the Rule 11 motion
decided at or near the disposition of the objectionable filing itself
ensures that the court will have sufficient facts and the parties ade-
quate notice to satisfy a due process requirement. 103 In addition,
100 765 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1985).
101 Courts have, however, inferred a duty to mitigate from the use of "reasonable ex-
penses" language in Rule 11. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers v. Armour &
Co., 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The court reduced the fees awarded under Rule II
from $22,000 to $7,500 holding that the "victim of a frivolous lawsuit must use reasonable
means to terminate the litigation." Id. at 350.
102 See, e.g., Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 539 (3d Cir.
1985) (order imposing Rule 11 sanction on counsel who has withdrawn is appealable as
collateral order); Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Co., 760 F.2d 1045, 1047 (9th
Cir. 1985) (any order imposing Rule 11 sanctions on counsel, a nonparty in the underlying
suit, is appealable as a collateral order).
103 Advisoy Comm. Note, supra note 16, 97 F.R.D. at 200:
The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements. The par-
ticular format to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situation
and the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many situations the
judge's participation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the
relevant facts and little further inquiry will be necessary.
See also In re Itel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226, 232-33 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (not recognizing
a seventh amendment right to ajury trial during post-judgment Rule 11 sanctions hearing);
Schwarzer, supra note 6, 104 F.R.D. at 198 (due process satisfied by memorandum and
declarations and no need for evidentiary hearing unless facts in dispute).
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determining the appropriateness of Rule 11 sanctions at the time of
the objectionable filing enables the court to more efficiently settle
the issues of what expenses and attorney's fees resulted from the
improper filing,' 0 4 as well as to make a record for any subsequent
collateral appeal.
Courts have responded to concerns for satellite litigation and
efficiency by relaxing the hearing formality required to satisfy due
process standards. 0 5 In addition, appellate courts apply varying
standards of review according to the nature of the district court de-
termination being contested.' 0 6
Although judicial willingness to impose Rule 11 sanctions for
improper motions can promote inefficiency through satellite suits,
the benefit of streamlined litigation and the decrease in improper
dilatory litigation tactics comport with the purposes of the amend-
ments. Furthermore, increased standards of appellate review com-
bined with careful and considered imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
can minimize the success on appeal. 10 7
II. Conclusion
Several commentators predicted that the 1983 amendments
expanding the scope of Rule 11 would result in an epidemic ofjudi-
cial activism and, consequently, limit access to the judicial system
and discourage attorney creativity in proposing new legal theo-
104 Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D.D.C. 1984) (Rule 11 "requires that the
work expended be causally linked to the improperly filed paper").
105 See note 103 supra.
106 The Ninth Circuit in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986),
announced a varying standard for review of Rule 11 sanction cases. Review of factual deter-
minations by the district court will involve a clearly erroneous standard while a challenge to
the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed invokes an abuse of discretion standard. Id.
at 828. Only when the decision of the district court involves a legal conclusion will the
Ninth Circuit institute a de novo review. Id. Other circuits have announced similar stan-
dards of review. See, e.g., Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1985); Eastway
Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). In Indianapolis Colts v.
City of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit held that the appellate
court review of denial of attorney's fees is "narrow and limited" and applied only an abuse
of discretion standard. Id. at 179. See also Larouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780
F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1986) (denial of attorney's fees will only be reversed for abuse of
discretion).
107 In Indianapolis Colts v. City of Baltimore, the Seventh Circuit awarded costs in-
curred in defending an appeal of a district court denial of Rule 11 sanctions, finding that
the appeal was without merit as the suit below was not frivolous. 775 F.2d at 182. In
Chemical Engineering Corp. v. Marlo, Inc. 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the appellate
court, while declining to award Rule 11 sanctions in the original action due to a possibility
that counsel had been misled, awarded costs for the appeal due to the frivolous nature of
the contention. In Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's award of attorney's fees and imposed additional sanctions
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for filing of a frivolous appeal.
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ries. l08 Although given considerably more power under amended
Rule 11, the courts have not exercised this new power imprudently
or indiscriminately. Instead, the courts have been extremly sensi-
tive to Rule lI's potential chilling effect. 109 The courts have only
invoked Rule 11 when the proferring of a unique legal theory was
tainted by improper motivation or inadequate legal or factual sup-
port.'10 The courts have also guaranteed access to the judicial sys-
tem by infrequently imposing Rule 11 sanctions on pro se
litigants. 1 '
The courts have been less reticent, however, to use the ex-
panded power of Rule 11 in controlling the proliferation of mo-
tions. This aggressive posture comports with the underlying policy
of deterring abusive litigation tactics and streamlining the litigation
process." 2 The potential for abuse in improperly motivated mo-
tions is considerable and defending an unfounded motion can be
costly for the opposing party. Therefore, to deter excessive motion
filing and to increase efficient adjudication of legitimate claims,
courts have used Rule 11 more aggressively in assessing the legiti-
macy of motions.
In the three years since Rule I l's amendment in 1983, almost
all federal courts have considered Rule II issues. With few excep-
tions, these courts have exercised caution in utilizing the full extent
of Rule I1's expanded power. Although several circuits appear to
consider Rule 11 violations more frequently than others," 3 Rule 11
issues are being increasingly considered in all circuits. 1 4 At first
glance, the increase appears to contravene the purposes behind the
amendments to the Rule. However, the increased judicial willing-
ness to sanction improper litigation tactics will deter future parties
from ever filing a frivolous pleading or motion. If, as Arthur Miller
suggests, the increased reach of amended Rule 11 will result in a
"two- or three-year period of hyperactivity,"" 5 judicial imposition
108 See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
109 See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
110 See notes 37-45 supra and accompanying text.
111 See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
112 See notes 14-17 supra.
113 Chrein, The Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 17 (1985)
(suggests that busier metropolitan districts are more likely to impose Rule 11 sanctions as
the courts in those districts are more aware of burgeoning caseloads).
114 From the August 1983 implementation of the amendments to Rule 11 until the end
of 1984, approximatly 130 cases addressed the applicability of Rule 11 sanctions. Chrein,
supra note 113, at 16. In 1985, reported decisions discussing Rule 1I sanctions exceeded
170.
115 Miller, supra note 47, 101 F.R.D. at 200.
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of Rule 11 sanctions should eventually decrease the number of friv-
olous filings in the future.
Nancy H. Wilder
